What Happens After Federal Prison

Pre-Release

After federal prison, an inmate is either sent to a federal half-way house, or placed directly on Supervised Release (Federal Probation is reserved for those who never received a prison sentence). An inmate, while in the halfway house, is still under the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons and can therefore be subject to release or relief in the same way they were while incarcerated (see Incarceration). Anything from home-confinement to early release is possible from a half-way house. PCR Consultants can help.

Post-Release, and Supervised Release

After full release from the BOP into the hands of the local United States Probation Office, a former federal inmate has years of probation((called Supervised Release)) to deal with. Supervised release comes with a host of general and specific rules that must be followed, or the supervisee faces more prison time. However, PCR Consultants can help you here too. From changing the terms of your release to better suit you to ending probation altogether, you can affect your own future and we can show you how.

Whether you need to modify (change or eliminate) a term of Supervised Release from your J & C Order, or motion to be released from Supervision altogether, PCR Consultants can put the right law and paperwork in your hands for a FRACTION of the cost of an attorney.

When on federal probation or supervised release (after federal prison time is served), the specific rules applied to each individual are unique. Most of the time these rules are lengthy and confusing so violations can occur accidentally by the probationer. Learn how to live on probation, how to be successful on probation, and how to structure actions to obtain your release sooner from supervision.

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UPDATE – Fricosu and the 5th Amendment

The Issue

For the last year or so, there has been a debate raging that seems to defy common sense. Namely, the debate concerns the 5th Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination. We’ve all heard congressmen, mob bosses, and steroid-riddled professional athletes use these protections to the point where, “Pleading the Fifth,” is part of the American lexicon.

See one of my favorite examples below:

The Debate – Fricosu and the 5th Amendment

The case in question( discussed here, here, and here), involved a mortgage fraud case out of Colorado where incriminating files were contained in a laptop with encryption so good the investigators and prosecution had no chance of recovering them without violating the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

Common sense, at least to this blogger, would say that forcing a defendant to decrypt his or her own hard drive for the prosecution violates 5th Amendment protections and is tantamount to doing the prosecutions job for them. Initially, the 10th Circuit begged off an appeal of the lower court order. This was, in theory, because they wanted to hear the case fully on appeal instead of ruling just on this specific order.

Common sense, however, gets lost in the details. The order by Judge Blackburn states that, although providing her password to the prosecution in order to enable them to decrypt her hard drive will violate her 5th Amendment protections, being forced to use her password to decrypt the hard drive and then turn the hard drive itself over to the prosecution is perfectly legal. This is based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, reached because the government has enough evidence to believe that the hard drive has incriminating files1

Well, the defense will do just that. The federal justice machine moves slowly, at times, and Miss Fricosu’s sentencing hearing (after a plea deal was reached) is set for August 8, 2013.2 Most plea agreements, including this one, now contain a waiver of appeal, a tactic brought to you originally by former federal prosecutor Bill Otis. This means that a defendant waives their ability to appeal. Fortunately, Miss Fricosu’s plea agreement adds an exception to the appeal waiver to bring up this issue at the 10th Circuit again after her case is finalized at the district level.

Ramifications and a Circuit Split

The idea that decrypting files for the government does not violate 5th Amendment privileges got its start with sex offense cases. It is easy to bend or even break constitutional protections against very distasteful defendants such as those charge with child pornography possession. The problem, however, becomes the extension of these constitutional ‘bends’ to the rest of the population.

This recent article from the folks over at ARS Techinca entitled “Fifth Amendment shields child porn suspect from decrypting hard drives” delves into the ramifications of these rulings moving forward, and how not all district judges agree with this ‘bend’. The article gets started this way:

A federal judge refused to compel a Wisconsin suspect to decrypt the contents of several hard drives because doing so would violate the man’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Judge William E. Callahan’s Friday ruling ultimately labeled the issue a “close call.”

Courts have wrestled with how to apply the Fifth Amendment to encrypted hard drives for several years. According to past rulings, forcing a defendant to decrypt a hard drive isn’t necessarily self-incriminating, but forcing a defendant to decrypt a hard drive can amount to self-incrimination if the government can’t otherwise show that the defendant has the password for the drive. In that case, forced decryption amounts to a forced confession that the defendant owns the drive.

Adding to this mix is this opposite Eleventh Circuit ruling from the same time as the Fricosu issue was becoming national news. It seems as though this issue will need to be settled by the U.S. Supreme Court, but it could be years before Cert is filed and granted in one of these cases.

Keep checking in, as updates will come as more events unfold around the country in this important electronic privacy and self-incrimination issue.

  1. This, because Fricosu said as much during a phone call from jail, which are all recorded. Bloggers note: this muddies the water quite a bit. Once the government knows there’s evidence, it makes the “self-incriminating” piece to this issue almost null. They want access to the hard drive that they’re POSITIVE has incriminating files on it, by Fricosu’s own words. The issue, though, is if Fricosu can be forced to help when self-incrimination has already kinda happened. []
  2. Sentencing hearing was set by order on 4/16/13 []

Kebodeaux Discussion Preview on SCOTUSblog

A week before the arguments are heard by the United States Supreme Court, the folks at SCOTUSblog have this commentary on the case, and what it all means. Below are some notable excerpts of the article.

This is a narrow case. It involves a defendant who represents a relatively small and, with time, diminishing class of individuals (those with sex-offender convictions pre-SORNA). It involves a defendant who is subject to SORNA by virtue of his military conviction, and not his interstate travel. And it involves a challenge to SORNA’s penalty provision, and not its other provisions (including its registration provision, although it may be hard to separate the two here).

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit ruling is by its own terms quite narrow, striking SORNA only as it applies in these “specific and limited facts.” The government sought review on, and the parties argue, even narrower questions. And both parties offer potential ways for the Court to dodge the core constitutional question. The government argues that the Court could simply correct the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous premise that Kebodeaux was not under a continuing federal registration obligation pre-SORNA and remand for further proceedings. Kebodeaux, for his part, argues that his failure to register occurred before SORNA applied to him, and therefore that he could not be validly convicted for failing to register under SORNA. (He says that the Attorney General had not yet issued valid regulations specifying that SORNA applied to pre-SORNA offenders when he failed to register.)

In short, this is no broadside challenge to congressional authority to require sex-offender registration. Instead, it is a very narrow case. And we can expect the Court to address it that way.

Still, bigger issues are likely to emerge in the arguments. Thus, look for the Court to press the government for limits on congressional authority, and to ask the government about federal intrusion into areas of traditional state concern. In other words, some on the Court are likely to worry about whether the government’s theories lead to an expansive federal power that can encroach too far on the states.

On the other hand, look for the Court to ask Kebodeaux about the sweep of federal power under Comstock, especially when Kebodeaux came under federal authority because of his military service, and not because of his interstate travels. Look for the Court also to test Kebodeaux’s theory of federal control pre-SORNA, given the full sex-offender registration scheme under the Wetterling Act (including the federal penalty for failure to register, and also including the federal financial incentives for states to create their own registrations and other features of the Act). The Court could see SORNA’s application to Kebodeaux as only a modest additional exercise of federal authority, given these considerations.